I am a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I hold a PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley and was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.
I apply formal theory and quantitative methods to questions about American political institutions. In particular, my dissertation uses formal theory to understand executive action. The first chapter, which presents an alternative to the first-mover view of unilateralism, appeared in The Journal of Politics. The second chapter, which examines the role of elite messaging and group power in conditioning political backlash, appeared in The Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy. The third chapter (with Joseph Warren), which examines the establishment of the federal bureaucracy as a device to mitigate policy feedback effects and enable a coalition of progressives and classical liberals, is conditionally accepted at The Journal of Politics.
In future work, I plan an empirical examination of the connection between unilateral action and lobbying. I also have an interest in the politics of local public/private goods, especially housing. The first paper of this agenda, coauthored with fellow Berkeley PhD student Joseph Warren, appeared in The Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Before starting my PhD, I studied economics and government at Hamilton College, graduating summa cum laude in 2010; I then consulted in New York and Washington, DC on securities and antitrust litigation.
I apply formal theory and quantitative methods to questions about American political institutions. In particular, my dissertation uses formal theory to understand executive action. The first chapter, which presents an alternative to the first-mover view of unilateralism, appeared in The Journal of Politics. The second chapter, which examines the role of elite messaging and group power in conditioning political backlash, appeared in The Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy. The third chapter (with Joseph Warren), which examines the establishment of the federal bureaucracy as a device to mitigate policy feedback effects and enable a coalition of progressives and classical liberals, is conditionally accepted at The Journal of Politics.
In future work, I plan an empirical examination of the connection between unilateral action and lobbying. I also have an interest in the politics of local public/private goods, especially housing. The first paper of this agenda, coauthored with fellow Berkeley PhD student Joseph Warren, appeared in The Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Before starting my PhD, I studied economics and government at Hamilton College, graduating summa cum laude in 2010; I then consulted in New York and Washington, DC on securities and antitrust litigation.